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A number of canonical and non-canonical Jaina texts relate the story of Jamåli, a disciple of 
Mahåv¥ra who went on to become Jainism's first heretic. The passages concerned, especially 
in the older texts, make a strange, even bizarre impression. They remain unintelligible, as it 
seems to me, until one realises that the story of Jamåli was used in order to deal with a 
theoretical issue that occupied the minds of many thinkers for some time during the history of 
Indian thought. 
 The Viyåhapannatti (Skt. Vyåkhyåprajñapti), canonical text of the Ívetåmbaras better 
known by the name Bhagavat¥, contains no doubt the oldest surviving version of what Jamåli 
supposedly had to say.1 He is here made to pronounce the following words: "Mahåv¥ra claims 
that what is moving, has moved; what is coming forth, has come forth; what is becoming 
perceptible, has become perceptible; what is decreasing, has decreased; what is being cut, has 
been cut; what is being broken, has been broken; what is being burned, has been burned; what 
is dying, is dead; what is being annihilated, has been annihilated. This is incorrect."2 All the 
cases enumerated by Jamåli present a combination of a present participle and a past 
participle. The position here attributed to Mahåv¥ra is indeed put in his mouth elsewhere in 
the same text.3 We will consider in a minute how these words have to be interpreted in their 
different contexts.4 Jamåli interprets them in an altogether special way, which becomes clear 
from the sequel. He continues, referring to the bed which his companions are making: "It is 
clear that the bed is being made, but has not been made, that it is being spread, but has not 
                                                
1 On the schism provoked by Jamåli, see further Leumann 1885: 98 sq. The Óvaßyaka-cËrˆi "suit généralement 
avec fidélité le modèle canonique que constitue la Viyåhapannatti ... Seuls deux courts passages propres aux 
[Óvaßyaka] sont rédigés en måhårå∑†r¥." (Balbir 1993: 146). Also a passage contained in Nemicandra's 
commentary on Uttarådhyayana 3.9 (Bombay, 1937, p. 69 f.) follows the Viyåhapannati. ÍåntisËri's commentary 
on this same passage was not accessible to me; cp. Jain 1975: 23. 
2 Viy 9.33.228 (p. 458), Ladnun edition (here cited); 9.33.96 (p. 477), Bombay edition; vol. 4 p. 102 in 
Lalwani's translation: jaˆ ˆaµ samaˆe bhagavaµ mahåv¥re evam åikkhaï, [evaµ bhåsaï, evaµ paˆˆaveï,] evaµ 
parËeï — evaµ khalu calamåˆe calie, ud¥rijjamåˆe ud¥rie, vedijjamåˆe vedie, pahijjamåˆe pah¥ˆe, chijjamåˆe 
chiˆˆe, bhijjamåˆe bhiˆˆe, dajjhamåˆe da∂∂he, mijjamåˆe mae, nijjarijjamåˆe nijiˆˆe, taˆ ˆaµ micchå. The 
part between hooks ([]) has been completed on the basis of Viy 1.9.420 (Ladnun). For a résumé of the story of 
Jamåli, see Deleu 1970: 163 sq. In translating the terms of this passage, I for the most part follow Deleu 1970: 
73. 
3 See below, note 32. 
4 See notes 19 and 20 in Lalwani's translation, vol. 1 p. 226-228. Deleu (1970: 73) observes: "Abhay[adeva's 
V®tti] indeed explains the different words as technical terms applying to the course of karman. It should be 
noted, though, that some of his equations are rather improbable ... and that in other places ... still other words are 
used to illustrate rather than formulate the tenet." 
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been spread."5 Jamåli appears to take Mahåv¥ra's remarks literally, and considers them to be 
meant for all combinations of present and past participles. He himself uses here two verbs 
which had not been used by Mahåv¥ra. He uses the verbs ‘to do’ and ‘to spread’, which are 
used when one speaks of making a bed. More generally, Jamåli's complaint appears to be 
based on the impossibility that present and past coexist at the same time. 
 The problem here raised reminds us of another one which occupied the minds of many 
Indian thinkers — including Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers — for a number of centuries. 
If one says "The potter makes a pot" is there then a pot in the situation described? In other 
words, is it justified to state that the pot that is being made has been made? Or is it correct to 
believe that a pot that is coming into being is already there, and has therefore already come 
into being? These and similar difficulties gave rise to a number of attempted solutions. Most 
thinkers agreed that there had to be something in the situation described in "The potter makes 
a pot" or "The pot comes into being" corresponding to the word ‘pot’. But what? The 
Buddhist Någårjuna and his followers concluded from the fact that there is nothing 
corresponding to the word ‘pot’ in the situation described that production cannot take place.6 
Others, most importantly the Buddhist Sarvåstivådins and the Brahmanical Såµkhyas, 
maintained that the pot is there, that things exist before they come into being; this position 
has come to be known by the name satkåryavåda. Others again, particularly the Naiyåyikas 
and Vaiße∑ikas, solved the puzzle by insisting that the word ‘pot’ can also refer to the 
universal that inheres in the individual pot, to potness; potness being eternal, it is there before 
the individual pot comes into being, and therefore present in the situation described by 
statements such as "he makes a pot". Other solutions had also been proposed, but this is not 
the occasion to discuss them. 
 Has the story of Jamåli as recounted in the Viyåhapannatti anything to do with this 
question as to how things can come into being? Jamåli protests against the notion that 
something that is being made has already been made. Does he here protest against the 
solution to this problem that the Jainas had come to accept? 
 The Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya of Jinabhadra (6th - 7th cent. C.E.; Mahårå∑†ra)7 discusses 
the problem raised by Jamåli and situates it indeed in the context of the question whether 
                                                
5 Viy 9.33.228 (p. 458)(Ladnun); 9.33.96 (p. 477)(Bombay); vol. 4 p. 102 in Lalwani's translation: imaµ ca ˆaµ 
paccakkham eva d¥saï sejjåsaµthårae kajjamåˆe aka∂e, saµtharijjamåˆe asaµtharie. 
6 Cp. MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåve 
utpadyate 'sati//. There is a particularly close parallel to Jamåli's position in Någårjuna's 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå 2.1, where Någårjuna, too, denies that a past and a present participle can characterise 
the same object: gataµ na gamyate tåvad agataµ naiva gamyate/ gatågatavinirmuktaµ gamyamånaµ na 
gamyate//. Jamåli would certainly agree with the beginning of this verse. 
7 Balbir 1993: 75. 
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something existent or non-existent can be produced. The following are some extracts from 
Ko†yårya's (9th cent. or earlier) commentary:8 
 
Jamåli, overcome by fever, instructed his pupils to make the bed. Seeing that what he had said had not 
been accomplished he got angry [and said:] "The sacred word (siddhåntavacana) to the extent that what 
is being done has been done is incorrect, because it goes against perception .... This bed is perceptibly 
being made, as a result of the instruction to spread the blanket; it has not been made at this [same] 
moment. ... For this reason everything that is being made, without exception, has not been made. ... 
Jamåli proves his own position: The claim (pratijñå) is that something that has been made is not being 
made, because it is [already] there, like an old pot. But if someone accepts that something, though 
made, is being made, then the state of being made would always be there, because [that thing] would be 
being made, like that which had been made during the first moment. And there would be no end to the 
activity of making ... For this reason [only] something that has not been made and is not there is being 
made. 
 
Jamåli is subsequently refuted in the following passage:9 
 
The opinion of the [ancient teachers is as follows:] Something that has not been made is not being 
made, because it is not there, just like a flower in the sky. But if one accepts that it comes into being, 
[saying] "that which initially was non-existent and had not been made is [now] being made", then one 
arrives at [the following] undesired consequence: also the horn of a donkey would then be being made; 
it must be being made, for it has not been made, just like the pot which you have accepted. ... 
 
This passage closely paraphrases the words of Jinabhadra's verse,10 and shows that for 
Jinabhadra only something that has been made can be being made. 
                                                
8 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 538 sq. (under verses 2789-93): jamålir dåhajvaråbhibhËta˙ 
‘saµstårakaµ kuruta’ ity ådißya ßi∑yån våksamakam ani∑pannaµ d®∑†vå ru∑ita˙ siddhåntavacanaµ ‘kriyamåˆaµ 
k®tam’ ity etad vitatham, pratyak∑aviruddhatvåt, aßråvaˆaßabdavacanavat/ ... saµstårako 'yaµ pratyak∑aµ 
kriyamåˆaß ca kambalaprastaraˆavyåpårådeßåt na cåsmin samaye k®ta˙/ punar api vastuprastaraˆasåpek∑åt 
kriyamåˆa eva, na k®ta˙, tasmåt kriyamåˆasya dharmiˆa˙ kriyamåˆatvam eva pratyak∑am idam, na k®tatvam, 
ani∑pannatvåt/ tata˙ kriyamåˆatvena pratyak∑asiddhena k®tatvaµ dharmo 'pan¥yate iti pratyak∑aviruddhatvam/ 
tasmåt sarvam eva vastu kriyamåˆaµ na k®tam eva, kriyåparisamåptau na˙ k®tam, nå''råt/ ... svamataµ tåvaj 
jamålir darßayati: k®taµ vastu na kriyamåˆam iti pratijñå, vidyamånatvåt, cirantanagha†avat/ atha k®tam api 
kriyamåˆa[m a]bhyupagamyate kenacit tata˙ sarvadå kriyamåˆåvasthaiva bhavatu, kriyamåˆatvåt, 
prathamasamayak®tavat/ na ca kriyåparisamåpti˙, sarvadå kriyamåˆatvåt, ådisamayavat/ ... viphalå ca kriyå, 
sarvavastËnåµ k®tatvån ni∑pannagha†avat/ tasmåd ak®tam avidyamånaµ ca kriyate/ 
9 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 539 (under verses 2795-96): sthavirå˙ ßrutajñånåptå˙/ te∑åµ 
matam: nåk®taµ kriyate, abhåvatvåt, khapu∑pavat/ atha tasya janmåbhyupagama˙: pËrvam abhËtam ak®tam eva 
kriyate/ tato 'ni∑†åpådanam: kharavi∑åˆam api kriyatåm, kriyamåˆaµ bhavatu, ak®tatvåt, tvadi∑†agha†avat/ yac ca 
tvayå do∑ajålam upak∑ipyate vidyamånasya karaˆe, tat sarvam avidyamånakaraˆe 'pi tadavastham: sarve tatråpi 
do∑å˙, asati avidyamåne kriyamåˆe ka∑†atarå vå do∑å bhaveyu˙ atyantåsambaddhatvådaya˙/ d®ßyatåµ vå: 
kriyate kharavi∑åˆaµ pËrvam abhËtatvåd i∑†akåryavat/ 
10 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 539, verse 2759: theråˆa mataµ ˆåkatam abhåvato k¥rate 
khapupphaµ va/ ahava akataµ pi k¥rati k¥ratu to kharavisåˆaµ pi// 
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 How is this peculiar position to be understood? Ko†yårya, elaborating on Jinabhadra's 
verse text, offers the following explanation. Something is not being made until the last 
moment of its production, which is also the moment at which it has been made. The 
production of the pot, for example, passes through a large number of stages — Ko†yårya 
mentions ßivaka, sthåsaka, and kußËla, and indicates that there are many more — during each 
of which not the pot but one of its earlier stages is being produced. When can one say that the 
pot is being made? Not until the end can be seen, i.e., not until the pot has been made.11  
 Jinabhadra's second explanation occurs elsewhere in the Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, 
where he criticises the Mådhyamikas, the followers of Någårjuna.12 Jinabhadra's own 
commentary on verse 2149 presents Någårjuna's position on the production of things in the 
following manner:13 
 
What has been produced is not being produced, because it is [already] there, like a pot. But if [you 
accept] that also what has been produced is being produced, you will have infinite regress. What has 
not been produced is not [being produced] either, because it is not there, like the horn of the donkey. 
And if [you accept] that also what has not been produced is being produced, you will have to accept 
that non-entities, such as the horn of a donkey etc., can be produced. 
 
This position is subsequently criticised. The following passage clarifies Jinabhadra's 
position:14 
 
In this world there are things that are being produced having been produced already, others [are being 
produced] not having been produced already, others [are being produced] having been produced and 
not having been produced, others again [are being produced] while being produced, and some are not 
being produced at all, according to what one wishes to express. ... For example, a pot is being produced 
having been produced in the form of clay etc., because it is made of that. That same [pot] is being 
                                                
11 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 539 sq. (under verses 2796-99): yad abhËtaprådurbhåve 
bhavatopapattir ucyate kriyåkåladrågh¥yastvam, tan naivåsti d¥rghakålakaraˆaµ gha†asya, yasmåd anyad¥ya 
evåsau d¥rghakålo na gha†asyeti/ ... iha pratisamayaµ piˆ∂a-sthåsaka-kußËlådaya utpadyante parasparavilak∑aˆå 
bahavaß ca/ te∑åµ bahutvåd yadi kriyåkålo d¥rgho bhavati, tata˙ kim åyåtaµ kumbhasya? tadåsau naivårabdha 
iti/ ... anyårambhe anyan na d®ßyate, anyatvåt, pa†årambha iva gha†a˙/ katham anyatvam iti cet? ßivakåd¥nåµ 
kumbhasya cånyatvam, parasparavilak∑aˆatvåt, pa†avat/ tasmåc chivakådyavasthåyåµ ßivakådyårambhe katham 
iva gha†o d®ßyata iti? ata evåsau årabdho yady anta eva d®ßyate svårambhakåle/ tata˙ ko do∑a˙? 
d¥rghkålatvåbhåva ity artha˙/ tasmåd årambhakåla eva kriyamåˆaµ tasminn eva ca vartamåne sampratikåle 
k®taµ tad bhavati/ 
12 See Butzenberger 1994. 
13 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 378 (under vers 2149): ... na tåvaj jåtaµ jåyate, vidyamånatvåt 
gha†avat/ atha jåtam api jåyate 'navasthåprasa∫ga˙/ tathå nåjåtam, avidyamånatvåt kharavi∑åˆavat/ athåjåtam api 
jåyate kharavi∑åˆådyabhåvajåtikriyåprasa∫ga˙/ 
14 Jinabhadra, Viße∑åvaßyaka Bhå∑ya, Part II, p. 385 (under verses 2183-84): iha kiñcit jåtaµ jåyate, kiñcid 
ajåtam, kiñcij jåtåjåtam, kiñcij jåyamånam, kiñcit sarvathå na jåyate, vivak∑åta˙/ .../ yatheha gha†o 
m®drËpådibhir jåta eva jåyate, tanmayatvåt/ sa evåkåraviße∑eˆåjåto jåyate, prågabhåvåt/ rËpådibhir 
åkåraviße∑eˆa ca [jåtå]jåto jåyate, tebhyo 'narthåntaratvåt/ at¥tånågatakålayor vina∑†ånutpannatvåt 
kriyånupapattir vartamånamåtrasamaya eva kriyåsadbhåvåj jåyamåno jåyate/ 
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produced not having been produced concerning its particular shape, because that was not there before. 
... 
 
This explanation is of course typical of the so-called anekåntavåda of the Jainas. 
 [Interestingly, authors more recent than Jinabhadra no longer make the connection 
between Jamåli and the problem of the production of things. This is true of Haribhadra (8th 
cent. C.E.), Í¥lå∫ka (9th cent. C.E.) and Abhayadeva (11th cent. C.E.).15 None of these three 
authors, where they deal with Jamåli, point out that the latter’s position would not allow 
things to be produced. This may have to do with the circumstance that they lived in a time 
when the problem of production had lost the general interest that had been bestowed upon it 
during the early centuries of the common era. In Haribhadra's Óvaßyaka-v®tti Jamåli's 
position is not refuted by pointing out that nothing would in that case come into being. It is 
refuted in an altogether different manner:16 "Oh teacher! the words of the holy one to the 
extent that what is being made has been made are not incorrect, and they are not against what 
is visible. Because the following reasoning would follow: if that which is being made, and 
which has [therefore] been entered by the action, is not accepted as having been made, then 
how can that (i.e., the state of having been made) be accepted even later when there is no 
action, like before when action had not yet undertaken [its work]. Because absence of action 
is not different [before and after the action]." Abhayadeva's commentary on the Sthånå∫ga 
refutes Jamåli in almost identical words.17 Í¥lå∫ka's commentary on the SËtrak®tå∫ga points 
out that that which is being made has been made according to the vyavahåranaya, the 
practical point of view. An example is the common usage "Devadatta has gone to 
Kånyakubja" even when Devadatta has only left today, and can therefore only be on his way 
to Kånyakubja; another one is the usage "this is a table (?, prasthaka)" in a situation where the 
wood for the table is just being cut.18 ] 
                                                
15 Ko†yårya is an exception, no doubt because he comments upon Jinabhadra's words that do make this 
connection. 
16 Haribhadra, Óvaßyaka-v®tti on MËla Bhå∑ya 126, p. 209: he åcårya! kriyamåˆaµ k®tam ityådi 
bhagavadvacanam avitatham eva, nådhyak∑aviruddhaµ, yadi kriyamåˆaµ kriyåvi∑†aµ k®taµ ne∑yate tata˙ 
kathaµ pråk kriyånårambhasamaya iva paßcåd api kriyåbhåve tad i∑yata iti sadå prasa∫gåt, 
kriyåbhåvasyåvißi∑†atvåt. 
17 Abhayadeva on Sthånå∫ga SËtra 587, p. 274: he åcårya! kriyamåˆaµ k®tam iti nådhyak∑aviruddhaµ, yadi hi 
kriyamåˆaµ kriyåvi∑†aµ k®taµ ne∑yate tata˙ kriyånårambhasamaya iva paßcåd api kriyåbhåve kathaµ tad i∑yata 
iti sadå prasa∫ga˙, kriyåbhåvasyåvißi∑†atvåt. 
18 See Í¥lå∫ka on SËtrak®tå∫ga-Niryukti 125, p. 154: vyavahåranayåbhipråyeˆa kriyamåˆam api k®taµ bhavati/ 
... na cåsau jånåti varåko yathå ayaµ loko gha†årthå˙ kriyå m®tkhananådyå gha†a evopacarati, (tattvata˙) tåsåµ 
ca kriyåˆåµ kriyåkålani∑†˙åkålayor ekakålatvåt kriyamåˆam eva k®taµ bhavati, d®ßyate cåyaµ vyavahåro loke, 
tad yathå: adyaiva devadatte nirgate kånyakubjaµ devadatto gata iti vyapadeßa˙, (lokoktyå) tathå dåruˆi 
chidyamåne prasthako 'yaµ (iti) vyapadeßa ityådi/. The expression kriyåkålani∑†˙åkålayor ekakålatvåt resembles 
a våkya of the Vaiße∑ika Ka†and¥ cited by Mallavådin: ni∑†håsambandhayor ekakålatvåt (Bronkhorst 1993:145). 
Is there a connection? The example of the journey to Kånyakubja makes of course only sense if we assume that 
Í¥lå∫ka lived more than a day's journey from that city. 
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 Other Jaina authors, often in contexts that do not mention Jamåli, confirm that there 
are different aspects to the process of coming into being. Something comes into being while it 
exists already from one point of view, whereas it does not yet exist from another point of 
view. Kundakunda, for example, states in his Pravacanasåra:19 "There is no production 
without destruction, nor destruction without production. Neither production nor destruction 
[are possible] without something that continues to be." Siddhasena Divåkara distinguishes in 
his Saµmatitarkaprakaraˆa (ca. 700) essentially two points of view, which he calls 
dravyåstika "the substance exists" and paryåyåstika "the modification exists".20 The result of 
this distinction becomes clear in verse 1.11:21 "Things are produced and disappear by force of 
the point of view of the modifications; everything is always without production and without 
destruction [by force of the point of view] according to which the substance exists." It is clear 
from all these passages that the aspectual approach, which is so typical of Jaina thinking, was 
used to solve the paradox of causality, as B.K. Matilal pointed out in 1981.22 We can be more 
concrete. The statement "the potter makes a pot" is not problematic for these Jaina thinkers, 
because the pot is already there "in a certain manner" while the potter is making it. 
 We must return to the story of Jamåli as told in the Viyåhapannatti. Is there reason to 
believe that this earliest surviving version of the story had already a connection with the 
question as to how things come into being? The sequel of the story provides a probable 
answer. Jamåli meets his old master, Mahåv¥ra, as well as Gautama, the latter's disciple. 
Gautama poses the following questions: "Is the world eternal or non-eternal? Is the soul 
eternal or non-eternal?"23 Since Jamåli cannot respond, Mahåv¥ra explains: "Jamåli! The 
world is eternal. Never did it not exist, never does it not exist, never will it not exist. It 
existed, it exists, and it will exist. It is firm, perpetual, eternal, indestructible, imperishable, 
durable. Jamåli! The world is non-eternal. Having declined, it comes up, and vice versa."24 
Similar observations are made with regard to the soul. 
 We recognise in this little sermon an early expression of the aspectual approach to 
reality which is so common in later Jaina authors. And I submit that it is no coincidence that 
Mahåv¥ra is made to preach precisely this sermon to Jamåli. It shows that Jamåli is presented 
                                                
19 Pravacanasåra 2.8: ˆa bhavo bhaµgavih¥ˆo bhaµgo vå atthi saµbhavavih¥ˆo/ uppådo vi ya bhaµgo ˆa viˆå 
dhovveˆa attheˆa//. Cp. Matilal 1981: 38. 
20 Saµmatitarkaprakaraˆa 1.3 (p. 271) with the commentary of Abhayadeva. 
21 Saµmatitarkaprakaraˆa 1.11 (p. 409): uppajjaµti viyaµti ya bhåvå niyameˆa pajjavaˆayassa/ davva††hiyassa 
savvaµ sayå aˆuppannam aviˆa††haµ//. Abhayadeva explains davva††hi(y)a as dravyårthika, and not as 
dravyåstika as he had done under 1.3. 
22 Matilal 1981: 26 f. ("Anekånta as a resolution of the paradox of causality"). 
23 Viy 9.33.231 (p. 459)(Ladnun); Viy 9.33.99 (p. 478)(Bombay); tr. Lalwani vol. 4 p. 104: såsae loe jamål¥? 
asåsae loe jamål¥? såsae j¥ve jamål¥? asåsae j¥ve jamål¥? 
24 Viy 9.33.233 (p. 459)(Ladnun); Viy 9.33.101 (p. 479)(Bombay); tr. Lalwani vol. 4 p. 104-105: såsae loe 
jamål¥! jaµ na kayåi nåsi, na kayåi na bhavaï, na kayåi na bhavissaï. bhuviµ ca, bhavaï ya, bhavissaï ya. dhuve, 
nitie, såsae, akkhae, avvae, ava††hie nicce. asåsae loe jamål¥! jaµ osappiˆ¥ bhavittå ussappiˆ¥ bhavaï, ussappiˆ¥ 
bhavittå osappiˆ¥ bhavaï. 
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as demurring against the orthodox Jaina position which maintained that something that has 
already been made is being made. To be sure, Mahåv¥ra is not only made to say this. He is 
also presented as holding that the world, or the soul, or other things we may assume, are non-
eternal. But the fact that all these things are also eternal makes it possible for them to come 
into being. For only something that is already there can come into being.25 
 
 It is time to drawn some conclusions. To begin with, there can be no question that the 
historical Mahåv¥ra and his disciple Jamåli really discussed the issue of the production of 
objects. The question as to how a pot can come into being becomes a major and widely 
discussed problem at a rather precise moment in history and then occupies the minds of 
practically all Indian thinkers for a number of centuries. One of the earliest thinkers who 
deals with it is the Buddhist Någårjuna. Probably already before him the Sarvåstivådins were 
aware of it, for they discuss it in their Vibhå∑å and in both versions of the Mahåvibhå∑å. 
Brahmanical thinkers appear to have been confronted with it later: the Såµkhyas not until a 
relatively later development of their school, probably after Någårjuna, the Vaiße∑ikas after the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra, etc. I have tried to document all this in another study,26 and it would take too 
much time to review all the relevant evidence here at present. The conclusion seems however 
clear: the question how things can come into being became an issue in the early centuries of 
the common era, not before that time. 
 It will be hard not to draw the conclusion that the story of Jamåli as told in the 
Viyåhapannatti cannot be older than these same early centuries of the common era. This 
should not surprise us. The Ívetåmbara tradition itself gives a late date (5th cent.) to the final 
redaction of its canon; the Digambaras altogether refuse to accept it as authentic. Linguistic 
features confirm that the Ívetåmbara canon in its surviving form is indeed late, considerably 
                                                
25 Note that the idea of an eternal world in which nothing disappears and nothing comes into being was not 
unknown to the Jainas. Already SËyaga∂a I, supposedly one of the oldest texts of the Jains canon, criticizes this 
position in the following two verses: "Es gibt in der Welt nach der Lehre Einiger fünf grosse Elemente. Der 
Ótman is das sechste. Ferner sagen sie: Ótman und Welt sind ewig. In zweifacher Weise gehen sie nicht 
zugrunde. Auch entsteht nicht, was nicht schon da ist. Alle Dinge, die es überhaupt gibt, ohne Ausnahme, sind 
ihrer Wesensart nach ewig."a If we assume that the position here criticized is itself a response to the problem of 
the production of things, it will be difficult to argue against a late date (roughly contemporaneous with 
Någårjuna or the Vibhå∑å of the Sarvåstivådins) for this part of the text, as late, therefore, as the date normally 
assigned to the Nijjutti which comments it (1st cent. CE; cp. Balbir 1993: 39). One can avoid this conclusion by 
assuming that these verses refer to Sarvåstivåda doctrine, partly distorting it in the process. Such an assumption 
is to some extent supported by the fact that the very next verse of this text is familiar with the Buddhist theory of 
momentariness, and appears to show acquaintance with the position of the Pudgalavådins. This issue will be 
explored in a separate study. 
aSËy I.1.1.15-16: santi panca mahabbhËyå iha-m-egesim åhiyå/ åya ccha††ho puˆo åhu åyå loge ya såsae// duhao 
na viˆassanti no ya uppajjae asaµ/ savve vi savvahå bhåvå niiya-bhåvam ågayå//. The translation and edition is 
Bollée's (1977: 15, 69), who explains (p. 72) the variant niyat¥bhåvam as follows: "Die einfachste Deutung der 
Überlieferung scheint mir die paläographisch leicht erklärbare Verschreibung von niya(t)¥ für niiya ~ sa. nitya, 
wobei das lange -¥ entweder analog zu anderen Zusammensetzungen mit bhåva entstanden sein oder auf ein 
ursprüngliches niiyaµ bhåvaµ hinweisen kann." 
26 Langage et réalité: sur un épisode de la pensée indienne, Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des 
Sciences Religieuses (in press). 
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later than the Påli canon of the Buddhists.27 Herman Tieken suggests, on the basis of a study 
of vocabulary, that the Vivågasuya (Vipåkaßruta) in its present form — i.e., one of the A∫gas 
— hails from Gujarat, and must therefore be relatively late. The same is a fortiori true, still 
according to Tieken, for the Paˆhåvågaraˆa (Praßnavyåkaraˆa), another A∫ga, and for the 
Dasaveyåliya-Nijjutti (Daßavaikålika-Niryukti).28 Morphological considerations lead him to 
think that the Uttarajjhåyå (Uttarådhyayana) is late.29 The canonical Aˆuogaddåra 
(Anuyogadvåra) refers to the Vaiße∑ika, Såµkhya and Lokåyata systems, and perhaps even to 
the Yoga-Bhå∑ya, and cannot therefore be anything but very young indeed.30 
 Do we have to conclude that the Viyåhapannatti as a whole dates from the early 
centuries of the common era at the earliest? Here various factors have to be taken into 
consideration. Jozef Deleu (1970: Introduction), following Albrecht Weber, has drawn 
attention to the fact that the Viyåhapannatti consists of a nucleus and accretions. The story of 
Jamåli clearly belongs to the old nucleus. According to Bansidhar Bhatt (1983), it belongs to 
the oldest one of three layers (Category I) within that old nucleus; unfortunately Bhatt gives 
no justification for this position.31 Second, Jamåli protests against a claim by Mahåv¥ra that is 
described in the following terms: "what is moving, has moved; what is coming forth, has 
come forth; what is becoming perceptible, has become perceptible; what is decreasing, has 
decreased; what is being cut, has been cut; what is being broken, has been broken; what is 
being burned, has been burned; what is dying, is dead; what is being annihilated, has been 
annihilated". This claim (sometimes expressed with the help of different verbs) occurs at least 
nine times in the nucleus of the Viyåhapannatti,32 the first time at its very beginning. Deleu 
comments (1970: 25): "Probably the antique character and the importance of this tenet are the 
                                                
27 Cp. Hinüber 1990: 22, 34-35, 50; Tieken 1997. 
28 Tieken 1997a. 
29 Tieken 1998. 
30 Cp. Bronkhorst 1995. [Added in proofs:] Paul Dundas (1998: 33) reports that "the Aupapåtika SËtra ... 
describes Mahåv¥ra's senior ascetic followers as being versed in magic spells and mantras (vijjåppahåˆå 
maµtappahåˆå)" but discounts this evidence for the early use of mantras in some shape or form to gain 
supernatural or soteriological ends "on the grounds that this scripture probably dates from around the beginning 
of the common era", and is therefore too early. It goes without saying that this evidence might indicate that a 
more recent date has to be assigned to the Aupapåtika SËtra. 
31 [Added in proofs:] Suzuko Ohira (1994) assigns the Jamåli story in the Viyåhapannatti to the 4th cent. C.E. 
(pp. 58 & 148 with 2). The oldest nucleus of the text, on the other hand, she assigns to the period 1st cent. 
B.C.E./1st cent. C.E. - 3rd cent. C.E. (p. 1). 
32 Deleu (1970: 25) enumerates Viy 1.1.1 [1.1.11-12 (p. 5)(Ladnun), 1.1.5 (p. 3)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 5-6 
(Lalwani)]; 1.6.1 (phu[s]samåˆe pu††he) [1.6.268 (p. 46)(Ladnun), 1.6.4 (p. 43)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 87-88 
(Lalwani)]; 1.7.3 (åhårijjamåˆe åhårie pariˆåmijjamåˆe pariˆåmie) [1.7.339 (p. 55)(Ladnun), 1.7.9 (p. 
52)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 104 (Lalwani)]; 1.8.2 (kajjamåˆe ka∂e saµdhijjamåˆe saµdhitte ˆivattijjamåˆe nivattite 
nisarijjamåˆe ˆisi††he) [1.8.371 (p. 63)(Ladnun), 1.8.7 (p. 59)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 119-20 (Lalwani)]; 1.10.1 
[1.10.442 (p. 74)(Ladnun), 1.10.1 (p. 69)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 139-40 (Lalwani)]; 8.6.3 (chijjamåˆe chiˆˆe 
pakkhippamåˆe pakkhitte ∂ajjhamåˆe da∂∂he; ukkhippamåˆe ukkhitte pakkhippamåˆe pakkhitte rajjamåˆe 
ratte) [8.6.255 (p. 358)(Ladnun), 8.6.11 (p. 364)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 199-200 (Lalwani)]; 8.7.1 (dijjamåˆe dinne, 
pa∂igahejjamåˆe pa∂iggahie, nisirijjamåˆe nisa††he) [8.7.280 (p. 361)(Ladnun), 8.7.11 (p. 368)(Bombay), vol. 3 
p. 209 (Lalwani)] (gammamåˆe gae, v¥tikkamijjamåˆe v¥tikkaµte) [8.7.291 (p. 363)(Ladnun), 8.7.23 (p. 
370)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 212 (Lalwani)]; 9.33.2 (story of Jamåli, see above); 16.5 (pariˆamamåˆå ... pariˆayå, 
ˆo apariˆayå)[16.5.55-57 (p. 721-22)(Ladnun), 16.5.8 & 10-11 (p. 756-57)(Bombay)]. 
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reasons why it was chosen as an appropriate exordium of the whole work."33 This tenet 
therefore appears to be as old as the oldest parts of the Viyåhapannatti. Does this mean that 
the problem connected with the production of things is as old as these oldest parts? 
 Not necessarily. It is true that the tenet according to which something that is being 
done has been done is used, in the story about Jamåli, to solve this particular problem. This, 
at any rate, is what I have argued so far. This does not however imply that the tenet had 
always been associated with this particular problem. It is at least conceivable that an old and 
obscure tenet came to be used to deal with a new problem in the story of Jamåli, viz., to deal 
with the problem of the production of things. 
 None of the other passages expressing the tenet that something that is being done has 
been done links it to the problem of production. Some give no clear context at all. Others 
however use the tenet for an altogether different purpose. Consider e.g. Viy 8.6.3, abbreviated 
by Deleu in the following manner (1970: 150):34 
 
A monk ... or a nun ... commits some fault during his/her begging-tour, peregrination or sojourn in a 
village and immediately feels regret and penitence about it and sets out to confess it to his/her superior 
... The superiors, however, or the monk/nun become unable to speak ... or die before or when they 
meet; consequently confession is impossible. In such cases of vis major the monk/nun still is loyal ..., 
because "the action that is being performed equals the completed action". 
 
Here the tenet is invoked in defence of monks or nuns who have not been able to carry out 
their intention to confess. In this context the tenet is obviously interpreted to mean something 
like "an action that is being performed is as good as the completed action", without 
metaphysical or ontological implications. Other passages (e.g. Viy 8.7.1) use the tenet 
similarly, to justify some form of behaviour on the part of the followers of Mahåv¥ra. 
 What about Mahåv¥ra's sermon to Jamåli to the extent that the world is eternal and 
non-eternal? Does this position occur for the first time in this story? And is it indissolubly 
linked to the problem of production? The situation may be somewhat more complicated than 
appears at first sight. Mahåv¥ra's sermon to the extent that the world is eternal and non-eternal 
cannot be separated from other passages in the Viyåhapannatti. Of particular interest is Viy 
                                                
33 See also Schubring 1926: 24 f. Deleu observes elsewhere (1977: 192) that "the tenet of the uncheckable 
process of action (E. Leumann's ‘irrevocabile factum’), which from of old the Jainas have held in such high 
esteem that its solemn enunciation was given the honour of opening the Viy[åhapannatti] itself ..., apparently 
was one of the greatest stumbling blocks to Mahåv¥ra's contemporaries. Not only was it flatly rejected by the 
anyat¥rthikas (I 101 ...), the same even denied the Theras to draw the most self-evident conclusions from it, e.g. 
(VIII 71 ...) to regard as their property something that had been given to them but did not reach them by some 
cause or other ... . Even ... the gods in heaven quarrelled about the validity of its implications (XVI 5 ...)." 
34 For detailed references to editions see note 32. 
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2.1.6 which contains the following teaching (Deleu's paraphrase; 1970: 89):35 "The world, the 
[single] soul, liberation and the [single] liberated being are finite, viz. single, from the 
material point of view and finite, scil. limited, from the point of view of (the) place (they 
occupy), but they are infinite from the point of view of time and condition." And Viy 7.2.6 
teaches (Deleu 1970: 135):36 "Beings in general (j¥va) ... are eternal from the material point of 
view, not eternal in respect of their conditions." Mahåv¥ra's sermon to Jamåli is therefore an 
example of a type also found elsewhere in the same text and in other canonical texts,37 and 
may — like the position criticised by Jamåli — be little more than a repetition of an old 
theme. 
 Here two further observations have to be made. First of all, it is practically impossible 
to decide the chronological relation between the various passages that express what came to 
be known as anekåntavåda. Some of them may be very young. Viy 2.1.6,38 for example, 
though belonging to the nucleus of the work, contains a reference to ∑a∑†itantra, the doctrine 
of sixty concepts that characterise Såµkhya in one of its forms. While the early history of 
Såµkhya may be too obscure to allow us to derive precise chronological conclusions from 
references to this school, the same is not true of ∑a∑†itantra. This aspect of Såµkhya is closely 
linked to the name of Vår∑agaˆya and his school, and was apparently a relatively late 
innovation.39 Second, Mahåv¥ra's sermon to Jamåli distinguishes itself in one essential respect 
from parallel passages. Unlike those other passages, this sermon does not state that the world, 
or the soul, is eternal from one point of view, and non-eternal from another point of view. It 
simply states that the world is eternal, and then continues by stating that it is non-eternal. It is 
conceivable that this is no coincidence. Qualifications might be felt to weaken the position 
that the world, or the soul, is eternal, and therefore weaken the connection with the statement 
to the extent that what is being made, has already been made. 
 Mention must here be made of Matilal's proposal (who follows in this respect 
Malvania) to look upon the anekåntavåda which expresses itself in the passages of the 
Viyåhapannatti just considered as a development of an earlier vibhajyavåda attributed to 
Mahåv¥ra in the SËyaga∂a (SËtrak®tå∫ga).40 The precise meaning of vibhajyavåda is object of 
speculation, but we may assume that an old tradition looked upon Mahåv¥ra as considering 
questions from various points of view. 
                                                
35 Viy 2.1.6 [2.1.26-48 (p. 83-89)(Ladnun), 2.1.13-24 (p. 77-84)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 153-163 (Lalwani)]. Cp. 
Matilal 1981: 20 f.; Weber 1867: 242 ff. 
36 Viy 7.2.6 [7.2.59 (p. 282)(Ladnun), 7.2.36 (p. 284)(Bombay), vol. 3 p. 26 (Lalwani)] 
37 For an exhaustive enumeration and discussion of such passages in the Jaina canon, see Bhatt 1978. 
38 Viy 2.1.6 [2.1.24 (p. 83)(Ladnun), 2.1.12 (p. 77)(Bombay), vol. 1 p. 152 (Lalwani)]. 
39 Frauwallner 1953: 319 f. 
40 Matilal 1981: 7; 19. 
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 Returning now to the story of Jamåli, it seems justified to conclude that this story 
brought together two kinds of statements that had been separately attributed to Mahåv¥ra by 
earlier tradition, and that the specific combination we find here, along with Jamåli's literal 
interpretation of one of these statements, provided a solution to the problem of production (or 
causality) that had come to occupy the minds of virtually all Indian thinkers. The statement to 
the effect that what is being made has been made was here, perhaps for the first time, taken 
literally, and provided a solution to the problem of production. However, the undesired 
consequence that this way a completely static picture of the world would arise, in which 
nothing would ever change, could be avoided by recalling Mahåv¥ra's habit to approach 
questions from various sides. 
 It is from this point onward that anekåntavåda, in the words of B.K. Matilal, becomes 
"a resolution of the paradox of causality". Perhaps we can go one step further, and maintain 
that the story of Jamåli in the Viyåhapannatti is the first expression (even though the term is 
not used) of anekåntavåda as a doctrinal position on a par with positions held by other 
schools such as satkåryavåda, sarvåstivåda, ajåtivåda, ßËnyavåda etc. Here for the first time, it 
would seem, anekåntavåda is used to solve a concrete and pressing philosophical problem, 
the same one which also those other positions were believed to solve by their respective 
followers. And even though the canonical texts of the Ívetåmbaras can hardly be called 
‘philosophical’ in a more technical sense, it is in the story of Jamåli that one philosophical 
issue that occupied many non-Jaina thinkers is seen to find its way into the Jaina texts. 
 One final observation has to be made. We have seen that the story of Jamåli as told in 
the Viyåhapannatti brings together two elements which both had existed independently 
beforehand, but which only together provide an answer to the problem of production. Most 
probably a third element will have to be added. This is the element of Jamåli himself. It is 
likely that an earlier story about this first schismatic once existed, for the name of Jamåli 
occurs in some apparently old enumerations in the Èhåˆa∫ga.41 According to the latter of 
these two, Jamåli was the name of the sixth chapter of the Aµtaga∂adasåo (Antak®ddaßå˙), 
now lost. Deleu (1970: 41 n. 43) concluded from this: "Probably the Jamåli episode originally 
belonged to Antag[a∂adasåo] 6 ... and was inserted in the Viy[åhapannatti] ...".42 This is 
certainly possible. It seems however unlikely that the earliest version of the story of Jamåli, 
supposing that an older version once existed, was in all details identical with the one we find 
                                                
41 Èhåˆa 7.141 (p. 754)(Ladnun), 7.587 (p. 241)(Bombay) and 10.113.1 (p. 813)(Ladnun), 10.755 (p. 
310)(Bombay). References to the Jamåli story occur also elsewhere in the canon; see Ógama Íabdakoßa vol. I p. 
301-02 s.v. Jamåli. 
42 See also Mehta and Chandra 1970: 275 s.v. “2. Jamåli”. 
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in the Viyåhapannatti.43 It is especially improbable that it dealt with, and offered a solution 
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